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The study illustrates that a ﬂnancial restriction may serve as a
disciplining device on the internal e–ciency of a ﬂrm, and that the
disciplining power is higher the tougher the product market competi-
tion is. The ﬂnancial restriction is modeled as a limited liability con-
straint, that is a non-negative proﬂt constraint. Hence, this limited
liability mechanism may, in part, account for the disciplining power
of product market competition on ﬂrm e–ciency, alleged by policy
makers as well as economists.
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\...the new competitive pressures brought about by the com-
pletion of the internal market can be expected to ...produce appre-
ciable gains in internal e–ciency...[which will] constitute much of
what can be called the dynamic eﬁects of the internal market..."
European Commission (1988, p. 126).
1 Introduction
In the absence of competition, production costs are higher than minimum
production costs. In the absence of competition, employees exert low eﬁort.
Moreover, the low eﬁort levels and high production cost, associated with
lack of competition, are too low and too high respectively, from a social
welfare point of view. These three notions are widespread among policy
makers as well as economists. And indeed, the empirical evidence (although
fragmentary) points in the same general direction: x-ine–ciency (in the sense
of high production costs) is more apt to be low when competitive pressures
are strong than when ﬂrms enjoy insulated market positions, Scherer and
Ross (1990 p. 672). Moreover, Scherer and Ross consider it plausible that
x-ine–ciencies attributable to monopoly power are at least as large as the
welfare losses from resource misallocations.
The purpose of the present study is to illustrate that a ﬂnancial restric-
tion, functioning as a limited liability constraint (non-negative proﬂt con-
straint), is a disciplining device which is more eﬁective the tougher the prod-
uct market competition is. Hence, this limited liability mechanism may,
in part, account for the alleged disciplining power of product market com-
petition on ﬂrm e–ciency. The study contributes to the policy debate by
pointing out that even if the decrease in x-ine–ciency should be considered2
as a welfare gain if competition is increased, for example by deregulation or
liberalization of trade, the gain may be out-weighted by a welfare loss due
to a more ine–cient allocation of risk.
Consider a ﬂrm in which the owner (principal) must hire a manager
(agent) to run the operations. The task of the manager is to organize pro-
duction so as to minimize production cost. The cost of production depends
partly on circumstances that are beyond the control of both the owner and
the manager, and partly on the amount of eﬁort the manager exerts in or-
ganizing production. The probability of a low marginal cost is increasing in
managerial eﬁort. It is presumed that internal e–ciency requires the manager
to exert high eﬁort, that is the decrease in expected marginal cost is larger
than the disutility of eﬁort. The owner can observe the resulting marginal
cost, but due to the separation of ownership from control, the principal can
observe neither the exogenous circumstances that aﬁect costs, nor the man-
ager’s eﬁort level. Since the principal is unable to judge whether a high
marginal cost is due to unfavorable external circumstances or to poor orga-
nization, the manager’s eﬁort must be induced by use of incentives in the
executive compensation plan. Compensation must be contingent on the real-
ized production cost. However, the agent is assumed to be more risk-averse
than the principal, who is taken to be risk-neutral. Hence, optimal risk-
sharing has the owner taking all the risk. To compensate for the risk-taking
by the agent, the principal must oﬁer the agent a higher expected wage, a
risk-premium. If the risk-premium is high enough the principal may prefer
not to induce eﬁort, resulting in low managerial eﬁort and high expected
marginal cost. Consequently, lack of information and con￿icting interests
gives rise to an internal (x-) ine–ciency.
The key insight in the present study is that the institution of limited3
liability may aﬁect the balance between incentives and insurance. A contract
that requires more payment than the principal can aﬁord is unenforceable,
under limited liability. Hence, an agent dealing with such a principal must
ensure that the contract never induces the principal to enter bankruptcy
(in which case the agent looses part of his compensation). The only way to
avoid bankruptcy is for the agent to accept a low compensation when other
costs are high. (The contract will look as if the principal is risk-averse:a si f
the principal has extreme disutility from negative outcomes.) Consequently,
limited liability will shift risk-taking from the principal to the agent. Hence,
we may suspect that managers will have more incentives to exert eﬁort to
ensure more favorable outcomes, under the institution of limited liability.
One could argue that limited liability on the part of the manager would
bind \before" the limited liability on the part of the owners of the ﬂrm. Al-
though I agree, it is the eﬁect of the latter that I am interested in, and to
simplify I abstract from the former. There is however no di–culty to con-
struct a model where both the principal and the agent have binding limited
liability constraints, and generate the same kind of result as obtained here.
Subsections 2.1 and 2.2 introduce notation and state conditions for e–-
ciency. In subsection 2.3 I replicate the classical ine–ciency result. Further,
it is shown that under full liability increased competition does not have any
eﬁect on the optimal, that is cost-minimizing, contract. In subsection 2.4, it
is shown that the limited liability constraint on the principal induces limita-
tions on the minimum penalty that can be imposed on a risk-averse agent.
Increased competition reduce revenues and tend to make the limited liability
constraint more binding. As a result the contract will stipulate more risk-
bearing by the agent and hence also more incentives. Consequently, increased
competition increases managerial eﬁort and reduces expected marginal cost.4
Finally, in the case managerial eﬁort is too low from a social welfare point of
view, increased competition reduces this internal (x-) ine–ciency. Section 4
contains concluding remarks and section 3 contains a brief survey of related
literature.
2T h e M o d e l
2.1 Preliminaries
Consider a ﬂrm where ownership and control are separated. The manager
can exert high eﬁort e = 1 or low eﬁort e = 0. The marginal cost c is either
high cH or low cL <c H. The probability for a low marginal cost depends on
eﬁort PrfcL j eg·p e. If eﬁort is high then the probability of low marginal
cost is high p1 >p 0 . The manager makes his eﬁort choice ex ante, that is
before he knows whether external conditions are good or bad. When more
than one ﬂrm operates on the market it is assumed that the realization of
marginal costs are independent across ﬂrms, so that the realization of costs
and hence proﬂt in one ﬂrm does not contain any information about the
external conditions for other ﬂrms. Hereby, I abstract from information
externalities between competing ﬂrms.1 The manager receives a wage w.
The wage contract (wH;w L) between the principal and the agent speciﬂes a
wage wL to be paid in case of a low marginal cost, and a wage wH to be paid
in case of a high marginal cost. Total cost is the sum of variable cost c ¢ q
1Competition allows the principal to make inferences about common shocks, which oth-
erwise conceal the agent’s choice of action - an information eﬁect of competition. Holm-
str˜ om (1982) and Nalebuﬁ and Stiglitz (1983) argue that competition is beneﬂcial because
it enables ﬂrms to base compensation on relative performance. Hart (1983) and Scharfstein
(1988) focus on how the market works as an implicit incentive scheme.5
and the ﬂxed cost of management consisting of the wage w
C = c ¢ q + w: (1)
If the ﬂrm is active it produces one unit of the good q = 1. This restriction
is used in order to abstract from the output eﬁect.2 Note that the restriction
can be made endogenous by assuming that cost is constant only up to a
capacity constraint qmax = 1. Expected costs depend on the eﬁort level and
are given by
E fC j eg =[ p ec L+( 1¡p e)c H]+[ p ew L+( 1¡p e)w H]: (2)
The ﬂrm’s revenues are certain and given by R(n;q)=P( n;q) ¢ q where
P (n;q) is the inverse residual demand function and n is the number of ﬂrms.
The functions R and P are assumed to be diﬁerentiable. Since q = 1 revenues
will normally be denoted R(n) and it is assumed that R is decreasing in n.
The expected proﬂt to the ﬂrm is given by
E fƒ j eg = R(n) ¡ E fC j eg: (3)
The manager’s von Neumann - Morgenstern utility is additively separable
in consumption and eﬁort and it is given by
u = U (w) ¡ D ¢ e (4)
where U is a diﬁerentiable, increasing and concave function, and D is the
disutility of eﬁort. If the manager does not work for the ﬂrm he receives u.
2Martin (1991) discusses demand eﬁects of competition: The residual demand curve
facing a single ﬂrm shifts inwards, and the equilibrium price-elasticity of residual demand
goes up. The ﬂrst of these demand eﬁects has also been labeled the output eﬁect of
competition (see for example Horn et al. 1994): A given reduction in marginal cost saves
more money for larger ﬂrms. Hence, the manager is willing to put more eﬁort into cost-
reduction in large ﬂrms than in small ones. Horn et al. (1994b) consider the eﬁect of trade.
Entry in a market reduce the size of ﬂrms and hence leads to increased marginal costs.
Trade has three eﬁects, two of which are variants of the output eﬁect: the entry eﬁect and
a market-enlargement eﬁect which operates in the opposite direction and dominate the
former. A general equilibrium eﬁects reinforce their result.6
If the manager is to work for the owner and exert low eﬁort, then the lowest
(certain) wage that keeps the manager at utility level u is given by
w0 (u)=U
¡ 1( u ); (5)
where U¡1 denotes the inverse of U. In particular, to keep the manager on
utility level u the lowest wage is w0 (u). I frequently write just w0 when it is
obvious that u is assumed.
If the manager is to work for the owner and exert high eﬁort, then the
lowest (certain) wage that keeps the manager at utility level u is given by
w1 (u)=U
¡ 1( u+D ). (6)
In particular, to keep the manager on utility level u the lowest wage is w1 (u).
I frequently write just w1 when it is obvious that u is assumed. To simplify,
let we (u)=U ¡ 1( u + D¢e ). Note that w1 >w 0and deﬂne the monetary
value of the disutility of eﬁort as
–(u) · w1 (u) ¡ w0 (u) > 0: (7)
I frequently write just – when it is obvious that u is assumed. Note that – is
the lowest eﬁort-premium at which the agent is willing to supply eﬁort.
The timing is the following. At time t = 1, the ﬂrm proposes a wage
contract (wH;w L). At time t = 2, the manager either accepts or rejects.
Consequently the model presumes that the principal has all the bargaining
power. Some authors argue that it is more realistic to assume that the agent
has (all the) bargaining power. I use the present assumption to abstract from
the income eﬁect of competition.3 If the manager rejects the oﬁer he receives
3Hermalin (1992) considers a model where the agent has (all the) bargaining power, to
establish an income eﬁect of competition. Increased competition will decrease the \pie"
over which the principal and agent bargain. Hence, increased competition will lower the7
u and the ﬂrm receives zero proﬂt. At time t = 3, the agent exerts high or
low eﬁort. At time t = 4, the cost level is realized to be either high or low.
At time t = 5, production takes place. At time t = 6, the ﬂrm earns its
revenue and the manager receives his wage.4
Note that if the cost turns out to be high, and if wH <w 0( u ) then the
manager would prefer to take his outside option, and to leave the principal.
However, the above timing commits the manager to the contract, since eﬁort
is exerted before the manager knows if external conditions are good or bad.
Moreover, at a high cost the principal might want to consider to cancel
production. At time t = 5, the principal is already bound to pay w and the
criterion for proﬂtable production is R(n) ¡c ‚ 0. However, this inequality
is automatically satisﬂed, when limited liability is satisﬂed, for all cases when
w ‚ 0 as is ensured when U (w)=l nw .
In order to maximize expected proﬂts, the ﬂrm proposes the contract
which minimizes the ﬂrm’s expected total cost C. To determine which con-
tract to propose, the principal ﬂrst calculates what wage contract will min-
imize expected wage, both for the case that he wants to induce high eﬁort,
and for the case that he wants to induce low eﬁort. Secondly the principal
compares the minimal cost given high eﬁort E fC j 1g with the minimal cost
given low eﬁort E fC j 0g.
agents income, and if \shirking" is a normal good, it will also be reduced. Another link
between the competitive pressure and the internal conditions of the ﬂrm is that a larger
number of ﬂrms may increase the demand for managers with the relevant experience, and
hence increase the manager’s reservation utility.
4Horn et al. (1994) discuss a strategic eﬁect of competition: if the compensation
scheme is chosen and made public information before product market competition, then
the induced level of marginal cost will aﬁect the second period equilibrium. They consider
three diﬁerent levels of competitiveness: Bertrand competition, Cournot competition and
a cartel. They show that there is a negative relation between the competitiveness of the
product market and the eﬁort incentives provided by the optimal contract.8
2.2 E–ciency
This section is used to deﬂne central concepts and to derive purely logical
relations between them. First, I state a deﬂnition of Pareto e–ciency, and
I also deﬂne internal e–ciency as the eﬁort level which minimizes the social
cost of production. Second, I show that Pareto e–ciency requires (i) full
insurance to the agent wH = wL, and (ii) that the ﬂrm is internally e–cient.
As usual, a feasible allocation is said to be (Pareto) e–cient if there exist
no other feasible allocation that make all individuals at least as well-oﬁ, and
at least one individual strictly better oﬁ, according to their own preferences.
The e–ciency criterion is here applied to the group of people consisting of
the principal and the agent. An allocation is taken to be an eﬁort level and
a wage contract. Hence the eﬁort level e and the wage contract (wH;w L)i s
e–cient (at u) if they solve the following program:
max
e;wH;wL
R(n) ¡ [pecL +( 1¡p e)c H]¡[ p ew L+( 1¡p e)w H]
subject to: peU (wL)+( 1¡p e)U( w H)¡D¢e‚u
(8)
The postscript \at u" to e–cient, emphasizes that the requirements for e–-
ciency may be diﬁerent for diﬁerent distributions of wealth (here measured
by the manager’s utility level u). However, I frequently make statements
about e–ciency, taking the distribution of wealth as given. That is, I refer
to an allocation as e–cient if it solves program (8) for u = u.
The social cost of producing the unit of output q consists of costs incurred
by the principal and costs incurred by the agent (there are no externalities).
At a utility level u the cost of production to the agent is, in monetary terms
we (u). The principal is incurred the cost c. Hence, the social cost of pro-
duction, in monetary terms is given by
S (c;e;u)=c+w e( u ): (9)9
The disutility of eﬁort is independent of the state of the world. Hence, the
expected social cost of production is given by
E fS j eg =[ p ec L+( 1¡p e)c H]+w e( u ): (10)
A ﬂrm is said to be internally e–cient (at u) if the eﬁort level is such that
the expected social cost of producing the unit of q is minimized. In that
case, I also say that the eﬁort level is internally e–cient. Claim 1 establishes
that internal e–ciency, as deﬂned here, is a necessary condition for Pareto-
e–ciency.
Claim 1 An allocation is e–cient (at u) only if:
(i) The wage contract provides full insurance to the agent, that is wH =
wL.
(ii) The eﬁort level is internally e–cient (at u).
Proof. The ﬂrst statement is well known, and it follows immediately
from the principal being risk-neutral and the agent being risk-averse. To
prove the second statement, let wL = wH = w. The restriction in program
(8), with equality, may be written U (w) ¡ D ¢ e = u that is w = we (u).
Substitute the restriction into the objective function to get R(n)¡E fS j eg
which is maximized when the second term is minimized.
To get su–cient conditions, the conditions of the claim must be comple-
mented by setting w so that the manager receives u.
Claim 2 High eﬁort is internally e–cient (at u), that is E fS j 1g <Ef Sj0 g
if and only if
(p1 ¡ p0)(c H ¡c L)>–( u ): (11)10
Hence, high eﬁort minimizes the social cost of production if the decrease in
expected marginal cost exceeds the monetary value of the disutility of eﬁort.
The inequality (11) is assumed to be fulﬂlled through out this study for u.
It is well known that e–ciency can be attained under some contracting
technologies, namely when the contract can be made contingent on e.
2.3 Full Liability
As a benchmark, and to introduce some notation, assume that there are no
limited liability constraints. Assume that the ﬂrm wants to induce low eﬁort,
e = 0. To ensure that the manager accepts the contract, the principal must
propose a contract that satisﬂes the individual rationality constraint IRe
peU (wL)+( 1¡p e)U( w H)¡D¢e‚u ; (12)
for e = 0. To minimize expected wage, the constraint must hold with equality.
Further, the principal must give the agent full insurance (wH;w L)=( w 0;w 0).
Expected total cost is accordingly
E fC j 0g =[ p 0c L+( 1¡p 0)c H]+w 0: (13)
If the ﬂrm induces high eﬁort, e = 1, then both the incentive-compatibility
constraint IC
p1U (wL)+( 1¡p 1)U( w H)¡D‚p 0U( w L)+( 1¡p 0)U( w H) (14)
and the individual rationality constraint IR1 given by expression (12) for e =
1 must be satisﬂed. Actually, to minimize expected wage, both constraints
hold with equality. The two constraints with equality can be used to solve
for the optimal contract (w⁄
H;w ⁄







Consequently, in order to induce eﬁort, the ﬂrm must pay an expected wage
bill that is higher than the wage w1 (which is su–cient to induce eﬁort when
eﬁort is contractible). That is, [p1w⁄
L +( 1¡p 1)w ⁄
H]>w 0+– . Moreover, let
‰ · [p1w
⁄
L +( 1¡p 1)w
⁄
H]¡( w 0+–)>0 (16)
denote the risk-premium that the ﬂrm must pay in excess of the eﬁort-
premium, –, to the manager, in order to induce high eﬁort, when eﬁort
is not contractible.
The expected cost given high eﬁort is given by
E fC j 1g =[ p 1c L+( 1¡p 1)c H]+( w 0+–+‰ ): (17)
The ﬂrm prefers to induce high eﬁort if and only if E fC j 1g•Ef Cj0 g ,
that is, if and only if
(p1 ¡ p0)(c H ¡c L)‚–+‰. (18)
This condition is more restrictive than the corresponding condition for e–-
ciency, expression 11, since here the ﬂrm must pay a risk-premium ‰. The
trade-oﬁ is between two kinds of ine–ciencies, either the principal chooses
internal e–ciency, then he must not give full insurance but pay a risk pre-
mium, or he gives full insurance, but then he looses internal e–ciency. In
order to focus on the case where a ﬂrm, under soft competition, has internal
ine–ciency, the inequality (18) is presumed not to be fulﬂlled throughout
this study.
Observation 1 If eﬁort is not contractible and the risk-premium is high
enough, ‰>( p 1¡ p 0 )(c H ¡c L)¡–, then the ﬂrm does not induce eﬁort.
Consequently, the expected production cost is high, that is E fc j 0g >Ef cj1 g ;
the expected wage bill is low, that is E fw j 0g = w0. Moreover, since
(p1 ¡ p0)(c H ¡c L)¡–>0this outcome is internally ine–cient.12
This is the classical ine–ciency result (see for example Tirole 1988). Al-
though the value of eﬁort (the decrease in expected marginal cost) exceeds
the disutility of eﬁort, eﬁort is not induced. Under other conditions the
ine–ciency may consist of too much eﬁort.
It should be noted that the statement about internal e–ciency com-
pares the information-constrained optimum with the ﬂrst best outcome, at-
tainable when eﬁort is contractible. One may doubt the value of making
such a comparison, since it is hypothetical when information constraints are
real. However, it gives a decomposition of the cost of production into two
parts: The (idealized) minimum cost E fc j 1g+w0 +–, and the ine–ciency
(p1 ¡ p0)(c H ¡c L)¡–>0. Such a decomposition may be useful since strate-
gies to lower the minimum cost are likely to be diﬁerent from strategies to
lower the ine–ciency. The former may be lowered by for example technical
progress, while the latter may be lowered by progress in social arrangements
such as monitoring, motivation and so on.






The ﬂrst inequality is more interesting since it is not a priori obvious that it
must hold. On the one hand w⁄
H should indeed be low to induce eﬁort. On
the other hand w⁄
H must be high in order to compensate for the disutility of
eﬁort, while w0 is not constructed to induce eﬁort. Further, it is this fact
that may make it proﬂtable to induce eﬁort when limited liability rules out
that w0 can be paid in case of a high marginal cost.
The Eﬁect of Competition To investigate the hypothesis that increased
competition decreases internal ine–ciency, the meaning of \increased com-
petition" must be made clear. One possibility is to think of increased com-13
petition as entry of new ﬂrms to one single market, for example due to
some deregulation. Entry will decrease residual demand and hence revenues
R(n +1 )<R( n ). Another possibility is to think of increased competition
as the integration of two formerly isolated markets. Such integration may,
for example, be the result of a liberalization of trade between countries or
the result of anti-trust policies toward exclusive territories. Now, increased
competition, from the point of view of the ﬂrm, consists of two eﬁects: First,
there is entry on the \home" market. Second, a new market has opened (the
market-enlargement eﬁect). Now, increased competition cannot be described
as a decrease in residual demand. Other measures of the intensity of com-
petition includes whether ﬂrms compete in prices or quantities (Horn et al.
1994, 1994b) and the share of owner-managed ﬂrms (Hart 1983). Also char-
acteristics such as the substitutability between products matter. However,
normally ﬂrms should experience decreased revenues as competition becomes
more intense, that is R(n +1 )<R( n ). This is the way that increased com-
petition is modeled in the present study.
If entry occurs, the ﬂrm will only be aﬁected by a decrease in residual
demand or revenues R(n +1 )<R( n ). As long as production is continued,
the optimal, that is cost-minimizing contract is not aﬁected since expression
(18) is left unchanged.
Observation 2 Absent a limited liability constraint, increased competition
does not aﬁect the cost-minimizing contract.
Implicit in the analysis has been that the ﬂrm’s individual rationality con-
straint, that is the zero-expected-proﬂt condition,
Eƒ=R( n )¡[ p 0c L+( 1¡p 0)c H]¡w 0‚0 : (20)14
is satisﬂed for the monopolist n = 1. If entry occurs, the zero-expected-proﬂt
condition (20) is harder to satisfy, but it is assumed that it holds, also for
n = 2. Note also that if n is increased so that the zero-proﬂt condition
is violated, then there are no possibilities to change the contract to ensure
survival of the ﬂrm. The contract already minimizes private production cost,
given the information constraints.
2.4 Limited Liability
A limited liability constraint LLi requires that the ﬂrm must not earn a
negative ex post proﬂt in state i = H;L:
ƒi = R(n) ¡ci ¡wi ‚ 0 i = H;L: (21)
An interpretation of this restriction is that the principal has invested all
his wealth, and that he cannot borrow any external funds. If proﬂt would
fall below zero, then the principal simply cannot pay the stipulated wage.
However, the parties are rational and foresee this. Consequently, the agent
will not accept an oﬁer that does not satisfy the limited liability constraint
(21). The limited liability constraint could alternatively be formulated as
not allowing ex post proﬂts below some negative number.
In the preceding section I considered the case when –<( p 1¡p 0)(c H ¡c L)<
‰+–, and the information-constrained ﬂrm there chose the ine–ciently low
l e v e lo fe ﬁ o r te= 0. Hence, the ﬂrm pays the same wage w0 to the man-
ager, regardless of the realized cost level. Since the wage is independent of
marginal cost, the critical limited liability constraint (21) is when marginal
cost is high, i = H. When competition is soft, revenues R(n) are high, and
the limited liability constraint need not be binding. However, if competition
is increased, revenues fall R(n +1 ) <R ( n ) and the limited liability con-15
straints tend to be harder to satisfy. In particular, it may well be that the
limited liability constraint binds for i = H but not for i = L, that is5
cL + w0 <R( n )<c H+w 0: (22)
Since the ﬂrm still can make a proﬂt when c = cL the limited liability con-
straint may induce exit despite the fact that the ﬂrm could earn a positive
proﬂt in expectation. However, there is a chance to survive if the contract is
redesigned in order to decrease the wage when marginal cost is high wH and
instead increase the wage when the marginal cost is low wL. In particular,
since w⁄
H <w 0<w ⁄
L, we may hypothesize that (w⁄
H;w ⁄
L) and a high eﬁort
level will be chosen by the principal. The purpose of this section is to prove
this conjecture.
The analysis will consider the case when (w⁄
H;w ⁄
L) satisﬂes limited lia-
bility. Hence (w⁄
H;w ⁄
L) minimizes the expected wage (when eﬁort is high)
subject to IR1, IC and limited liability. The expected cost when eﬁort is







be the wage contract that minimizes the expected
(given low eﬁort) wage subject to individual rationality IR0, and limited









p0wL +( 1¡p 0)w H
subject to:
(IR0) p0U(wL)+( 1¡p 0)U( w H)‚U( w 0)
( LLi) wi • wi (n) · R(n) ¡ ci i = H;L
(23)
The limited liability restriction LLi is simply (21) rewritten to be expressed
5A su–cient condition for this to happen for some n is that R(1) ‚ cH + w0 and
R(n) ¡R(n +1 )•c H¡c L 8 n:16
as a restriction on the contract wages. Note that since the limited liability
restriction depends on the number of ﬂrms, so will also the optimal wage
contract depend on the number of ﬂrms. For all small n such that the limited







(w 0;w 0). When competition is intense R(n) <c H+w 0, it turns out that wl
H
is the highest wage that can be paid that does not violate the LLH constraint.
Moreover, wl
L is set so that IR0 is satisﬂed with equality.
























+( 1¡p 0)U( w H( n )) =
U (w0).
All proofs are relegated to Appendix A.
Claim 4 If w⁄






does not induce eﬁort.






does not induce eﬁort, it does impose
some risk on the manager. It is convenient to discuss in terms of a limited










The limited liability premium measures in expectation, the additional wage
relative to w0, that must be paid to the agent to compensate him for taking


























If competition becomes more intense, then revenues fall and hence the limited
liability constraint becomes more binding. Consequently, the amount of risk
imposed on the manager must be increased.

























and no eﬁort is induced,
e =0 ,i sg i v e nb y
Ef Cj0 g=[ p 0c L+( 1¡p 0)c H]+( w 0+‚( n )): (25)
The expected cost to the ﬂrm if it oﬁers (w⁄
H;w ⁄
L) and eﬁort is induced, e =1 ,
is given by expression (17). A comparison of these costs gives the condition
for the principal to choose high or low eﬁort.
Claim 7 If w⁄
H < wH, then the principal prefers to induce eﬁort if and only
if
(p1 ¡ p0)(c H ¡c L)>–+‰¡‚( n ): (26)
Now, if condition (26) is compared with condition (18) we see that the
additional cost of inducing high eﬁort is lower, when the limited liability con-
straint is binding, ‚>0, than when it is not. Further, increased competition
will increase the limited liability premium, ‚0 > 0, and hence reduce the
additional cost of inducing high eﬁort. When ‚(n) is large enough condition
(26) is satisﬂed and the principal prefers to induce eﬁort. Hence, the main
result of the present study is:
Observation 3 Assume that increased competition reduces revenues and
thereby makes the limited liability constraint more binding. Then increased
competition will aﬁect the optimal agency contract. In particular, contrasting18
a market with more competition to one with less:
(i) Managerial contracts impose more incentives.
(ii) Managers exert more eﬁort.
(iii) Managers earn a higher expected wage.
(iv) Firms produce with a lower expected marginal cost.
(v) The ﬂrm is more internally (x-) e–cient.
Since Observation (2) establishes that increased competition does not aﬁect
internal conditions when there are no limited liability constraints, it is the
interplay between product market competition and ﬂnancial restrictions that
produce this result.
My main interest concerns the eﬁect of competition on internal ine–-
ciency, statement (v). However, it is likely to be hard to measure inter-
nal e–ciency for empirical investigation. As a consequence it may be valu-
able to state closely related implications of the model that may be sub-
ject to empirical testing. In this way it is possible to get indirect tests
of the main statement. Among these statements (i), (iii) and (iv) may
\in principle" be subject to empirical testing. However, statement (i) pre-
supposes the existence of some measure of the degree of incentives that
are present in a wage contract. Without giving any general deﬂnition, it
is clear that in the present model, the degree of incentives can be mea-
sured by the diﬁerence in expected wage, given high and low eﬁort, that is
E fw j 1g¡Ef wj0 g=( p 1¡p 0 )(w L¡w H). Statement (ii) is more prob-
lematic since it presupposes that eﬁort may be observable to the \econome-
trician," although it is not observable for contracting. Such data can hence
not be collected from the ﬂrm’s accounts, but could perhaps be attainable
through for example interviews.
It should be noted that although competition reduces internal ine–ciency,19
the net welfare eﬁect is negative in the present model. This is due to the fact
that increased competition only will make the owner switch from internal
ine–ciency to an ine–ciency in the form of imposing risk on the manager.
So, in a sense, the conclusion in this study is a bit pessimistic: Although it
may be true that increased competition reduces internal (x-) ine–ciency, if
the mechanism is the one presented here, this should not be considered as a
social welfare gain.
One may however argue that the present model over-emphasizes the
weight of a single manager in the social welfare function. Should the cost
of managerial eﬁort not be negligible compared to the potential reduction
in production cost? If we interpret the manager as \the administration,"
however, proportions are restored. Recall that Radner (1992) estimates that
a signiﬂcant fraction, perhaps more than 40 percent of the labor force, is
devoted to the activity of managing.
Another objection to the Observation is that ﬂrms with high revenues do
not tend to pay their managers less than ﬂrms with low revenues. Rather,
managers in large ﬂrms tend to earn more than managers in small ﬂrms.
However, the Observation is concerned with changes in revenues for a given
size of the ﬂrms as measured by total costs (disregarding the possible subse-
quent fall in marginal cost due to changed incentives). That is, a low mark-up
R¡C should lead to a high w. However, again one needs to be careful, since
there are other mechanisms that may give rise to a positive relation between
R ¡ C and w. For example the manager may have some bargaining power,
which enables him to capture some share of the expected proﬂt.
One may again want to question the use of (p1 ¡ p0)(w L¡w H) >–as
a criterion for e–ciency, since it is hypothetical when information problems
and limited liability are real. However, again one may argue that such a20
decomposition is useful since costs due to information problems ‰ and costs
due to limited liability ‚ are diﬁerent in character. Their levels are given
by quite diﬁerent considerations, and programs to reduce them are likely to
involve quite diﬁerent strategies.
To verify that the assumptions of the above analysis are consistent and do
not deﬂne the empty set (of possible applications): First, use the following
functional forms: U (w)=l nwand R(n)=a ¡ b ¢ n:Second, use the following
values for the exogenous variables: u =0 ,D=1 ,p 0=0 : 2, p1 =0 : 5, cL =0 ,
c H=1 9 : 4, a = 22, b = 1. See Stennek (1994) for details.
3 Related Literature
There are a couple of other papers that have shown that ﬂnancial restric-
tions may discipline the ﬂrm. Grossman and Hart (1982) show that the
risk of bankruptcy can discipline the managers of a ﬂrm. Without the risk
of bankruptcy, the managers will use the ﬂrm’s funds for private consump-
tion rather than to invest. Hence, the managers will be unable to raise any
capital. With a bankruptcy-risk and if the ﬂrm goes bankrupt a receiver is
able to recover all funds that are not invested, leaving the manager with no
consumption. Under these circumstances the manager will use some of the
funds to invest and hence reduce the risk of bankruptcy. A similar argument
is Jensen’s (1986) control hypothesis for debt creation. By issuing debt in
exchange for stock, without retention of the proceeds of the issue, managers
are bonding their promise to pay out future cash ￿ows. Thus debt reduces
the agency cost of free cash ￿ow available for spending at the discretion of
the manager. See also Schmidt (1994).
Apart from the contract models cited in connection with the presentation21
of the model, Varian (1994) has studied the relation between the competitive
pressure on the product market and ﬂrm e–ciency in an evolutionary setting.
From a methodological point of view, the present study is related to other
contract models that include limited liability constraints. To my knowledge
there is only one study, Innes (1990), that includes a limited liability con-
straint on the principal. In Innes (1990) both the agent and the principal
are risk-neutral, and hence the contract need not meet any risk-sharing re-
quirements. The agent (who has all the bargaining power) maximizes his
incentives to exert eﬁort by signing a \live-or-die" contract, giving him all
the proﬂt in high-proﬂt states of nature, and a constant share ﬂ<1 of ﬂrm
proﬂts in low-proﬂt states of nature. In some cases even ﬂ = 0 is insu–cient
to induce e–cient eﬁort. The signiﬂcance of limited liability constraints, in
this model, is that they limit the strength of incentives for eﬁort. For ex-
ample, the limited liability of the principal implies that the agent cannot be
given more than all the proﬂts when proﬂt is high. The agent is at most
residual claimant when proﬂt is high. In the present study the limited liabil-
ity constraint implies that the agent must at least be residual claimant when
proﬂt is low. So, in Innes (1990) limited liability means that there is an upper
bound on the strength of incentives to a risk-neutral agent. Here, there is a
lower bound on the risk-bearing for a risk-avert agent. Although it may be
possible to derive eﬁects of product market competition on eﬁort also in an
Innes type of model (which is constructed to study ﬂnancial contracting), I
consider my formulation more natural for the study of how competition disci-
plines managers. Other models of ﬂnancial contracting have included limited
liability constraint only on the agent. Brander and Spencer (1989) show that
an owner/manager of a ﬂrm may exert sub-optimal eﬁort because of limited
liability. The reason is that the bank, and not the owner/manager is residual22
claimant in high cost states. Moreover, they show that the eﬁort level in
monopoly ﬂrms is lower than the eﬁort level in competitive ﬂrms. The main
reason for this is however that eﬁort aﬁects output directly, and that the
monopolist faces a downward sloping demand, implying that the monopolist
will lower his price by increased eﬁort. Sappington (1983) considers a model
with a risk-neutral agent that can observe productivity before he acts, and
shows that limited liability on the agent will make the optimal contract in-
clude less than full incentives and hence will lead the agent to take less eﬁort
than the e–cient level. See also Kahn and Scheinkman (1985) and Farmer
(1985) for an application to the issue of underemployment in recessions.
4 Concluding Remarks
A limited liability constraint on the principal induces limitations on the mini-
mum penalty that can be imposed on a risk-averse agent, also when low eﬁort
is induced. Increased competition reduces revenues and tends to make the
limited liability constraint more binding. As a result the contract will stip-
ulate more risk-bearing by the agent and hence also a higher risk-premium.
Consequently, the additional risk-premium cost of inducing high eﬁort is re-
duced. When competition is intense enough, the owner of the ﬂrm switches
from inducing low to inducing high eﬁort. Hence, the main conclusion is
that increased competition increases managerial eﬁort and reduces expected
marginal cost. Moreover, in the case managerial eﬁort is too low from a
social welfare point of view, increased competition reduces this internal (x-)
ine–ciency.
Intuitively, it may appear as if the mechanism behind the result is that
limited liability forces the agent to bear some risk, that this increase in23
risk-bearing automatically creates more incentives for eﬁort, and hence au-
tomatically induce more eﬁort. However, as the model is written this is not
entirely correct, due to the fact that e is a discrete variable. Rather, it is
shown that, in the presence of a limited liability constraint, the contract






becomes more expensive with
increased competition n, while the contract that induces eﬁort (w⁄
H;w ⁄
L)i s
left unchanged. At some point, competition is hard enough to make the sec-
ond contract more attractive than the ﬂrst. So, at some point competition
makes the ﬂrm switch from a \boundary solution contract" to an \interior so-
lution contract." There is however no gradual change in the \interior solution
contract." However, I suppose that the initial intuition could be formalized
more directly with a more smooth model.
Assume low eﬁort to be socially e–cient. Then, when competition is soft
the ﬂrm may choose the socially e–cient level of eﬁort. Then the possibility
may arise that increased competition leads to an internal ine–ciency (as it
is deﬂned in the present study), in the form of too much eﬁort.24
AP r o o f s
Proof of Claim 3 Consider the case when R(n) <c H+ w 0 . Sup-
pose that limited liability is satisﬂed, but that IR0 is not binding. Then
the principal can reduce any wage, without breaking limited liability. As-
sume that IR0 bind, but that limited liability when i = H does not bind
and contemplate a transfer of wage from state L to state H such that IR0












































that is a decrease in expected wage.


















= U(w 0). From the construction of (w⁄
H;w ⁄
L) we also
know that p0U (w⁄
L)+(1 ¡ p0)U (w⁄
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By assumption we have w⁄
H < wH (n)=w l
H( n ). Hence we must have
wl
L <w ⁄
Lfor (27) to hold. IC holds only if U (wL) ¡ U (wH) ‚
1
p1¡p0D.
By construction U (w⁄
L) ¡ U (w⁄
H)= 1

























does not satisfy IC.25
Proof of Claim 5 For all n such that cH + w0 >R( n )w eh a v e
w
l
H( n )<w 0<w
l
L( n ): (28)
The ﬂrst inequality hold since wl
H = wH = R(n) ¡ cH <w 0 . Given the
ﬂrst inequality, the second inequality must hold in order to satisfy expression
(12) for e = 0. Due to the concavity of U the inequalities (28) imply that
p0wl
L +( 1¡p 0)w l
H >w 0. Hence, ‚(n) > 0.
Proof of Claim 6 Ignore the integer-problem and assume all func-
tions to be diﬁerentiable. Then ‚0 (n)=p 0
dwl
L
















L)R0 (n). Hence ‚0 (n)=








. For all n such that cH + w0 >R ( n )w eh a v e
w l
H( n )<w l




L) > 1 and hence ‚0 (n) > 0.26
References
Brander, J. and Spencer, B. (1989). \Moral Hazard and Limited
Liability: Implications for the Theory of the Firm," International Eco-
nomic Review 30, 833-849.
European Commission (1988). The Economics of 1992, European Econ-
omy, 35.
Farmer, R. (1985). \Implicit Contracts with Asymmetric Information
and Bankruptcy: The Eﬁect of Interest Rates on Layoﬁs," Review of
Economic Studies LII, 427-442.
Grossman, S., and Hart, O. (1982). \Corporate Financial Structure
and Managerial Incentives," in: The Economics of Information and
Uncertainty, J. McCall (ed.), The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Hart, O. (1983). \The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme," Bell
Journal of Economics 14, 366-382.
Hermalin, B. (1992). \The eﬁects of Competition on Executive Behav-
ior," Rand Journal of Economics 23, 350-365.
Holmstr˜ om, B. (1982). \Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Eco-
nomics 13, 324-340.
Holmstr˜ om, B., and Tirole, J. (1989). \The Theory of the Firm,"
in Handbook of Industrial Organization, R. Schmalansee and R. Willig
(Eds.). North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Horn, H., Lang, H., and Lundgren, S. (1994). \Competition, Long
Run Contracts and Internal Ine–ciencies in Firms," European Eco-
nomic Review 38, 213-233.27
Horn, H., Lang, H., and Lundgren, S. (1994b). \Managerial Ef-
fort Incentives, X-ine–ciency and International Trade," forthcoming
in European Economic Review.
Innes, R. (1990). \Limited Liability and Incentive Contracting with Ex-
ante Action choices," Journal of Economic Theory 52, 45-67.
Jensen, M. (1986). \Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance,
and Takeovers," American Economic Review 76, 323-29.
Kahn, C. and Scheinkman, J. (1985). \Optimal Employment Con-
tracts with Bankruptcy Constraints," Journal of Economic Theory 35,
343-365.
Martin, S. (1991). \Endogenous Firm E–ciency in a Cournot Principal-
Agent Model," Journal of Economic Theory 59, 445-450.
Nalebuff, B., and Stiglitz, J. (1983). \Information, Competition,
and Markets," American Economic Review 73, 147-155.
Radner, R. (1992). \Hierarchy: The Economics of Managing," Journal
of Economic Literature XXX, 1382-1415.
Sappington, D. (1983). \Limited Liability Contracts between Principal
and Agent," Journal of Economic Theory 29, 1-21.
Scharfstein, D. (1988). \Product-Market Competition and Managerial
Slack," Rand Journal of Economics 19, 147-155.
Scherer, F. and Ross, D. (1990). Industrial Market Structure and
Economic Performance, Third Edition, Houghton Mi†in Company,
Boston.28
Schmidt, K. (1994). Managerial Incentives and Product Market Compe-
tition, Discussion Paper No. A-430, University of Bonn.
Stennek, J. (1994). Essays on Information-Processing and Competi-
tion, Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm Univer-
sity, Monograph Series No. 27. Ph.D. Thesis.
Tirole, J. (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization, The MIT
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Varian, H. (1994). \Entry and Cost Reduction," unpub. ms. University
of Michigan.